James560492 said
Engines were the big limiter in that era. Consider the issues the Germans in particular had with underpowered engines. Even something looking as simple as the use of Merlin engines on aircraft gets complex when you realize how many versions there were of it (without considering the Meteor version used in tanks).
As for the Sherman igniting easily this is more to do with poor ammo storage initially than the fuel (see Neil Grant's Osprey book on British Tank Crew in the Warrior series).
Basically you end up with a choice - a few standardized tanks or lots of variants.
The problem still hadnt gone away in the late Cold War - the Soviets had the T64,T72 and T80 all being produced at once with variations even in these such as the T80D with a diesel engine as the gas turbine engines weren't available!
The Russians lost their enthusiasm for gas turbine engines in tanks after the First Chechen war, in which their fuel consumption and the inflammability of the kerosene fuel proved to be serious disadvantages.
Morph01 said
Ken P said
J. Southworth said
Gothic Image said
How much of that was evolution rather than lack of standardisation?
Making the same tank with four different engines at the same time makes no sense in terms of military efficiency and ease of supply. The best version was the M4A2 with the diesel engine, the petrol engined versions were very liable to catching fire if hit and were supposedly referred to as "Ronsons" after the cigarette lighter by the Germans, although their tanks also had petrol engines. The M4A2 was mostly used by the US Marine Corps.
I would suggest that four different engines makes little difference. Most military equipment is engineered for extended peacetime use, whereas most equipment survives only for only a few days/weeks on the front line. Extensive engine repairs or swap outs are rare during a dynamic war (the tank's environment) and even a single engine type would require a sizeable logistic and engineering support. The T34 was the ideal solution as a 'throw-away' weapon. Maybe not as powerful as a Tiger, but three T34s could take out a Tiger with the loss of one T34. This may have cost you a tank crew, but they are the cheapest component in the equation.
I have witnessed field engine swap outs of Chieftains in a German farmyard. Two cranes, two 20ton Fodens with replacement engine and parts, a REME detachment with Field workshop and various domestic vehicles. In real life this would have been a couple of miles behind the FEBA and would have required at least a platoon of infantry to secure the immediate area.
Meanwhile the battle was moving at something like 30 miles per day. Much more sensible to torch the thing and move a replacement forward.
Lanchester's Law in effect. It's what beat the Germans in Russia. Their tanks were inferior, but they had a lot of them.
For those not in the know. Lanchester's Law
Suppose you have a Tiger (tank A), with a firepower of say 100 units and a 'life' of 250 units, and it opposes 5 tanks (B)of firepower 40 units and 'life' of 150 units.
ist exchange, tank A targets (assume 100% accuracy) one of tank B units, it does 100 units of damage. 5 unit B's also fire, inflicting 200 units.
2nd exchange, Tiger hits the same tank B, destroying it. Even if it hits before the others can retaliate, they still produce 160 units of damage which is enough to wipe tank A.
Devised by Lanchest and others in 1916, as a strategy for warfare, but I doubt it had the desired effect in the trenches.
The T34 was the most common Soviet tank during the Second World War, but they also had heavier tanks, like the KV and IS series with the 122mm gun, and heavy self propelled guns and tank destroyers like the SU 100 with 100mm gun, the SU 152, ISU 152 and ISU 122, which were capable of combating the Tiger and Panther tanks on roughly equal terms.
From mid 1943 onwards the Germans were defending most of the time and this gave them tactical advantages, they could channel the Russian armor into killing zones using minefields and anti-tank ditches, where it could be destroyed by carefully positioned, dug-in and camouflaged tanks and heavy anti-tank guns. But Hitler's orders to defend every inch of ground limited the German field commanders and led to the collapse of Army Group Centre in 1944.